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Researchers using experimental paradigms to examine cognitive processes have demon-
strated that Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is associated not with a general deficit in
cognitive functioning, but instead with more specific anomalies in the processing of nega-
tively valenced material. Indeed, cognitive theories of depression posit that negative biases
in the processing of information play a critical role in influencing the onset, maintenance,
and recurrence of depressive episodes. In this paper we review findings from behavioral
studies documenting that MDD is associated with specific difficulties in attentional disen-
gagement from negatively valenced material, with tendencies to interpret information in
a negative manner, with deficits in cognitive control in the processing of negative mate-
rial, and with enhanced memory for negative material. To gain a better understanding of
the neurobiological basis of these abnormalities, we also examine findings from functional
neuroimaging studies of depression and show that dysfunction in neural systems that
subserve emotion processing, inhibition, and attention may underlie and contribute to the
deficits in cognition that have been documented in depressed individuals. Finally, we briefly
review evidence from studies of children who are at high familial risk for depression that
indicates that abnormalities in cognition and neural function are observable before the
onset of MDD and, consequently, may represent a risk factor for the development of this
disorder. By integrating research from cognitive and neural investigations of depression,
we can gain a more comprehensive understanding not only of how cognitive and biological
factors interact to affect the onset, maintenance, and course of MDD, but also of how
such research can aid in the development of targeted strategies for the prevention and
treatment of this debilitating disorder.
Keywords: depression, MDD, neuroimaging, amygdala, interpretation bias, attention bias, memory bias, cognitive
control
INTRODUCTION
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a debilitating psychiatric
condition that is characterized by a range of emotional, cognitive,
and behavioral symptoms, including core features of persistent
depressed mood and decreased interest or pleasure in usually
enjoyable activities. MDD is also highly prevalent; almost 20%
of the American population will experience at least one clini-
cally significant episode of depression in their lifetime (Kessler
and Wang, 2009). Further, more than 75% of these individu-
als will go on to experience a subsequent episode of depres-
sion, often within the first two years of recovery (Boland and
Keller, 2009). Given these alarming statistics, it is important for
researchers to elucidate the cognitive and neurobiological factors
that are involved in the onset, maintenance, and recurrence of this
disorder.
Beck’s (1976) cognitive model of depression has advanced
our understanding of depression and has served as the founda-
tion for multiple lines of research. This model posits that early
adverse events, in combination with other (e.g., genetic, person-
ality) factors, can lead to the development of depressive self-
referential schemas that influence information processing through
negative biases in attention, memory, and cognition. These biases
then confer vulnerability for depression by leading individuals to
interpret their experiences in systematically negative ways.
Since the formulation of this model, a wide body of research
has amassed examining the cognitive mechanisms of depression
and refining cognitive theories of this disorder (Ingram, 1984;
Teasdale, 1988; Mathews and MacLeod, 2005). In this paper we
review important findings from this work, focusing in particu-
lar on research demonstrating that depression is characterized by
negative biases in attention, interpretation, memory, and cognitive
control. We also present and discuss findings from studies using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to elucidate the
neural underpinnings of these biases, and review how cognitive
and neural dysfunction in depression may influence emotion reg-
ulation and inform the development of new treatments. Finally,
we briefly discuss the implications of findings of extant research
for the prevention of depression.
ATTENTIONAL BIASES
EARLY STAGES OF PROCESSING
The question of whether depression is associated with biases dur-
ing the initial orienting to emotion-relevant information has been
examined in studies that use subliminal or very rapid presentations

























































Foland-Ross and Gotlib Cognition in depression
of affective material. For example, in the dot-probe task, two
stimuli (one neutral, the other positively or negatively valenced)
are presented simultaneously for a brief duration (e.g., 14 ms).
A dot then appears in the previous location of one of the two
stimuli and participants must indicate the location of the dot
as quickly as possible. Biased allocation of subliminal atten-
tion to negative emotional material in this task is indicated by
faster reaction times to the dot when it appears in the loca-
tion previously occupied by the negative stimulus. Using this
task, Mathews et al. (1996) found no difference in reaction times
between clinically depressed and non-depressed participants to
anxiety-relevant words. Similarly, Mogg et al. (1995) found evi-
dence for a negative attentional bias in participants diagnosed
with an anxiety disorder, but not in participants diagnosed with
depression.
These findings, which suggest that depression is not character-
ized by automatic biases in attention toward negative material, are
consistent with results of studies using the subliminal version of
the emotional Stroop. In this task, participants are presented with
a series of masked emotional and neutral words, and the time par-
ticipants take to name the non-semantic attributes of the words
(most typically the ink color in which a word is presented) is used
as a measure of attentional interference caused by the emotional
content of the masked words; an increase in reaction time indi-
cates an increase in attention to the emotional meaning of the
word. Researchers have largely failed to find a difference between
clinically depressed and non-depressed participants’ latency to
name the colors of subliminally presented negative words (Mogg
et al., 1993; Bradley et al., 1995a; Lim and Kim, 2005). Similarly,
Yovel and Mineka (2005) found no associations between biases
for subliminally presented depression-relevant words and levels
of self-reported depressive symptoms in a sample of undiagnosed
undergraduate students.
Finally, a subliminal lexical decision task has been used to exam-
ine biases in the rapid orienting to negative material in depression.
In this task, participants are presented with a subliminal prime
emotional or neutral word, followed by a supraliminal string of let-
ters that participants must judge as being a word or not. Increased
attention toward negative material is indicated by shorter response
latencies to supraliminal words that are negative in valence and
that are identical, or semantically related, to the meaning of the
subliminal prime. Using this task, Bradley et al. (1994) found that
undiagnosed graduate students with higher levels of negative affect
exhibited stronger priming effects for depression-relevant words,
and further, that priming effects were more strongly associated
with symptoms of depression than with symptoms of anxiety.
However, Matthews and Southall (1991) and Dannlowski et al.
(2006) failed to observe an effect of subliminal negative primes on
reaction times to target words in a sample of clinically depressed
individuals.
Although the available behavioral research suggests that major
depression is not characterized by biases in the rapid orienting
of attention toward negative material, investigators have begun
to use neuroimaging methodologies to further explore whether
there is neural evidence for biases to subliminally presented stim-
uli in the absence of observable group differences in behavior.
Investigators in this area have focused primarily on patterns of acti-
vation in the amygdala, a region that is crucial to the perception of
salient affective information and that can process emotional infor-
mation on a subconscious level by virtue of direct connections
from the retina via the superior colliculus and pulvinar (Pes-
soa, 2005). Results from these investigations are mixed. In one
early study, Sheline et al. (2001) observed greater amygdala activa-
tion in clinically depressed, relative to non-disordered,participants
during the passive viewing of emotional backward-masked faces;
importantly, this pattern of hyper-reactivity was not found to be
valence-specific. More recently, Dannlowski et al. (2008) found
no difference in amygdala reactivity between clinically depressed
and non-disordered participants during the viewing of masked
sad and angry faces. In contrast, both Suslow et al. (2010) and
Victor et al. (2010) found heightened amygdala activation in clin-
ically depressed relative to non-depressed participants during the
viewing of masked sad faces. It is important to note, however,
that 20% of the depressed participants in Suslow’s study and 50%
of Victor’s depressed sample met diagnostic criteria for comor-
bid anxiety. Therefore, it is not clear whether increased amygdala
reactivity in depressed participants in these latter investigations
was influenced by this comorbidity.
Considered collectively, there is only modest evidence to sup-
port an association between major depression and a subliminal
attentional bias toward negative material. While two studies have
reported that a neural processing bias may occur in the absence of
observable differences in behavior, the influence of anxiety comor-
bidity clearly requires further investigation. Certainly, distinguish-
ing effects of anxiety from depression on subliminal attention will
help to clarify whether these biases are central to the onset and
maintenance of depressed mood individuals vulnerable to MDD.
Given the high prevalence of comorbid depression and anxiety
(Sartorius et al., 1996), however, as well as data showing that the
combined disorders are characterized by a more severe course
of illness than is either disorder alone (Keller et al., 1983, 1984;
Brown et al., 1996), it will be important for researchers to con-
tinue to assess patterns of cognitive and neural dysfunction that
are associated with comorbid depression and anxiety.
Future research examining automatic processing biases in
depression may also benefit from the use of techniques, such as
electroencephalography (EEG), that yield high temporal precision.
Event-related potentials, for instance, have been used successfully
to document differences in the spatial and temporal patterning
of neural activity occurring in response to emotional stimuli pre-
sented overtly and outside conscious awareness (Williams et al.,
2007b). Neuroimaging approaches may also further elucidate the
basis for other supraliminal biases in cognition. In a pair of studies,
for example, Dannlowski et al. (2007a,b) found that both clinically
depressed and non-depressed individuals who exhibited particu-
larly high levels of amygdala activity in response to subliminally
presented negative facial expressions, rated neutral material as
more negative in a separate series of cognitive assessments con-
ducted outside the scanner than did individuals with low levels of
amygdala reactivity. Thus, rapid and automatic patterns of neural
responding in the amygdala may contribute to other supraliminal
biases in cognition.
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LATER STAGES OF PROCESSING
In contrast to investigations of attention biases to subliminal
stimuli in depression, findings from studies examining biases to
negative stimuli that are presented at longer (supraliminal) dura-
tions are more consistent in suggesting the presence of a mood-
congruent bias in attention. When the presentation of emotional
facial expressions is extended in the dot-probe task from 14 to
1000 ms for example, clinically depressed participants, in compar-
ison with non-disordered controls, exhibit longer reaction times
to sad than to happy, angry, or fearful faces (Gotlib et al., 2004;
Fritzsche et al., 2010). This bias has also been found in formerly
depressed participants (Joormann and Gotlib, 2007), as well as
in non-disordered girls at familial risk for depression (Joormann
et al., 2007b; Kujawa et al., 2011), suggesting that attentional biases
are involved in risk for the onset and recurrence of MDD (but see
also Mogg et al., 1995; Koster et al., 2006). Based on the results
of these and similar studies, researchers have posited that depres-
sion is not characterized by a rapid orienting to negative stimuli,
but instead, involves difficulties in disengaging from this material
once it captures an initial attention (e.g., Gotlib and Joormann,
2010). In line with this formulation, clinically depressed individu-
als are not found to generally differ from non-disordered controls
in their likelihood of attending to negative stimuli, but once their
attention is captured by such stimuli, they spend significantly more
time looking at this material than do controls (Mathews and Antes,
1992; Eizenman et al., 2003; Caseras et al., 2007; Kellough et al.,
2008).
Investigators have documented heightened amygdala activa-
tion in clinically depressed individuals during the passive viewing
of negative emotional stimuli (Siegle et al., 2002, 2007b; Anand
et al., 2005; Dichter et al., 2009; Peluso et al., 2009; but also see
Davidson et al., 2003; Irwin et al., 2004), suggesting that atten-
tional biases in the supraliminal processing negative material may
be associated, at least in part, with functional abnormalities in
this brain region. Moreover, it appears that increased amygdala
activation in MDD is sustained beyond the presentation of the
negative material itself. For example, Siegle et al. (2002) found
that during a valence identification task, whereas non-disordered
controls exhibited amygdala responses to all stimuli that decayed
within 10 s, clinically depressed individuals were characterized by
sustained amygdala responses to negative words that persisted
through a subsequent non-emotional distracting task (25 s later)
that was designed to induce activation in brain areas hypothe-
sized to suppress activation in the amygdala (e.g., dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex; dlPFC). Moreover, sustained amygdala activa-
tion to unpleasant words in this study was correlated in depressed
participants with self-reported rumination, a hallmark feature of
depression that has been posited to be closely linked to sustained
processing of negative information. Results that are conceptually
similar to findings of sustained amygdala activation in MDD have
been obtained in studies examining EEG and pupillary dilation
responses to affective material (Deldin et al., 2001; Siegle et al.,
2001, 2003; Deveney and Deldin, 2004). Considered collectively,
therefore, the available research suggests that depressed persons’
affective experience of negative stimuli persists well beyond the
direct exposure to the material and that this processing interferes
with engagement in subsequent activities.
Biases in attention to negative stimuli in MDD have also been
found in studies using the supraliminal version of the emotional
Stroop. Similar to the subliminal version of this task, participants
are asked to name the colors in which a series of emotional and
neutral words are presented; delays in response times are inter-
preted as indicating interference caused by increased attention to,
and processing of, the emotional meaning of the words. Investi-
gators using the supraliminal emotional Stroop task have found
that clinically depressed participants take longer than do non-
disordered controls to name the color of negative, but not of
positive words (Gotlib and McCann, 1984; Williams and Nulty,
1986; Gotlib and Cane, 1987; Gilboa and Gotlib, 1997). One neu-
roimaging study has examined patterns of activation occurring
during the performance of this task and found that a bias for
negative words in clinically depressed individuals was associated
with increased activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex
(rACC) and precuneus (Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008). This pat-
tern of the results, in the rACC in particular, appear relevant to the
study of attentional biases in depression; a large body of research
supports a role of this region in the top-down control of atten-
tion to emotional material (Bush et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000;
Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Increased rACC activation in depressed
individuals during the processing negative words, therefore, could
indicate that these participants require additional activation in
this area to be able to override the interference caused by the emo-
tional meaning of these stimuli. The positive correlation that was
observed in this study in depressed individuals between activation
in the rACC and reaction time latencies to color naming of nega-
tive words supports this interpretation. It is also possible, however,
that increased activation in the rACC of depressed participants is
related more generally to a role of this region in the processing of
salient emotional information; the rACC is activated by a variety of
affective paradigms, including tasks that involve the generation of
sad mood and attention to affective (versus non-affective) charac-
teristics of a pictorial stimuli (Bush et al., 2000; Phan et al., 2004).
Thus, it is difficult to determine whether depression-associated
anomalies in behavior and brain function during the emotional
Stroop are due to negative biases in attention, to negative biases in
inhibitory function, or both. The question of whether depression
is associated with valence-specific biases in inhibition and cogni-
tive control is an important area of research that we discuss in
greater detail below.
Other investigations of possible biases in supraliminal atten-
tion to negative material in depression have turned to the use
of an emotional version of the Go/No-Go task. In this task, par-
ticipants are presented with a series of words and are asked to
initiate a button press to words that match a target valence and
withhold a button press to words that do not. Faster reaction
times are interpreted as indicating better detection and, there-
fore, increased attention to the emotional meaning of the word.
Murphy et al. (1999) found that, compared with non-disordered
controls, clinically depressed participants were faster during “Go”
trials when responding to sad versus happy words. This MDD-
related bias toward negative material on the emotional Go/No-Go
task has since been replicated (Erickson et al., 2005; Kyte et al.,
2005; Kaplan et al., 2006), and been associated in one neuroimag-
ing study with abnormally elevated activation in the rACC (Elliott
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et al., 2002). Thus, consistent with the neuroimaging literature
on the emotional Stroop task, biases in attention toward nega-
tive words in the emotional Go/No-Go task appear to be directly
related to dysfunction in this region.
One final paradigm that investigators have used to examine
the influence of emotion on attention in depression is the emo-
tional oddball task. In a typical oddball experiment, participants
are presented with infrequent task-relevant (target) events, to
which they initiate a button press, embedded within a continuous
stream of frequent standard events. Other task-irrelevant (distrac-
tor) events that are equally infrequent are also presented, and the
valence of these distractor events is manipulated to assess whether
increased attention toward these events influences reaction times
to subsequent task-relevant targets. Wang et al. (2008) recently
found that, compared with non-disordered control participants,
clinically depressed individuals exhibited significant slowing of
responses to task-relevant targets when they were preceded by
sad, but not by neutral, distractors. Thus, depressed participants
appeared more easily distracted by task-irrelevant negative (but
not neutral) stimuli than were non-disordered controls, and this
distraction interferes with ongoing task performance.
Interestingly, in examining the neural aspects of performance
on the emotional oddball task, Wang et al. (2008) found that
whereas non-disordered participants’ responses to targets that fol-
lowed negative (relative to neutral) distractors were associated
with activation in the rostral ACC and insula, depressed partic-
ipants did not show these activations. This difference in activation
is important not only in again implicating the rostral ACC in
attentional processing biases in depression, but in suggesting more
specifically that dysfunction in this region (and in the insula) is
associated with, or contributes to, difficulties disengaging from
the processing of irrelevant mood-congruent material. What is
more, depressed participants in this study demonstrated abnor-
mal elevations in activation of executive (dlPFC) and inhibitory
(ventrolateral PFC; vlPFC) regions as they responded to target
events that followed sad (but not neutral) distractors. Wang et
al. interpreted this pattern of function as compensatory, mak-
ing up for insufficient levels of activity in the rACC and insula
(Harvey et al., 2005; Wagner et al., 2006), although it is also pos-
sible that depressed individuals require greater recruitment of the
lateral PFC when trying to minimize interference from negative
emotional stimuli. Such a formulation is consistent with results
of another recent functional neuroimaging study conducted by
Kerestes et al. (2012), who found that, compared with their non-
depressed counterparts, formerly depressed participants exhibited
increased activity in the dlPFC and vlPFC during the presentation
of negative, but not of positive, emotional distractors in a working
memory task.
Considered collectively, the results of these studies suggest
that depression is not characterized a rapid automatic biasing
toward negative information, but instead, by difficulties disengag-
ing attention from negative material once it has captured initial
attention. Increased processing of negative material by depressed
individuals may result from dysfunction in the amygdala. In addi-
tion, findings from neuroimaging studies using the Go/No-Go,
Stroop, and emotional oddball tasks support the involvement of
dysfunctional executive and inhibitory centers in difficulties in
attentional control in depression. As we noted above, however,
because accurate performance on some of aforementioned tasks
depends on intact inhibitory function, it is difficult to determine
whether negative biases in attention or in inhibitory function drive
neural and behavioral abnormalities. The question of whether
depression is associated with valence-specific biases in inhibition
and cognitive control is an important area of research that we
discuss in greater detail below.
INTERPRETATION BIASES
Investigators have posited that biases in the interpretation of emo-
tionally ambiguous material play a central role in the onset and
maintenance of depressed mood. In one early study, Butler and
Mathews (1983) examined whether clinically depressed individ-
uals interpret ambiguous information more negatively than do
non-disordered individuals. These researchers presented partici-
pants with ambiguous social scenarios and then asked them to
select, from a set of provided options, which interpretation was
the most likely to come to mind. Clinically depressed participants
chose the more negative option more frequently than did con-
trols, suggesting the presence of a negative interpretation bias.
This finding has since been replicated (Nunn et al., 1997; Voncken
et al., 2007). Also consistent with these reports, Mogg et al. (2006),
found, using a homophone task in which participants listened
to ambiguous words (e.g., die/dye, weak/week) and then wrote
the word they heard, that clinically depressed participants tended
to write more negative words than did their never-depressed
counterparts.
Although informative to our understanding of cognitive func-
tioning in depression, findings of these studies are limited by
depression-associated biases in self-report. That is, rather than
processing ambiguous material in a more negative manner,
depressed persons may have a greater tendency than do their non-
depressed peers to report a more negative meaning of scenarios
when queried directly about their interpretations. To address this
issue, investigators have turned to the use of tasks that involve
indirect measures of bias, such as reaction time. Results from
these studies, which have generally assessed dysphoric individuals
(i.e., individuals experiencing subclinical levels of depression), are
mixed. Lawson and MacLeod (1999) presented participants with a
series of ambiguous sentences, each of which was followed by a tar-
get word that participants read aloud and that was related to either
the negative or the neutral interpretation of the sentence. Reac-
tion times to target words were used as an index of interpretation
bias: shorter response latencies to negative words than to neutral
words were interpreted as being primed by a negative interpreta-
tion of the sentence. Results of this study showed no difference
between dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals in reaction
times to negative words. This finding was later replicated in a
sample of dysphoric participants who received a negative mood
induction (Bisson and Sears, 2007), suggesting that response biases
were responsible for the negative biases in interpretation reported
in previous studies. In another study of dysphoric individuals,
however, Lawson et al. (2002) found that dysphoric individuals
who exhibited greater severity of depressive symptoms, compared
to individuals who were experiencing lower levels of depressive
symptoms, showed increased magnitude of the eye blink reflex,

























































Foland-Ross and Gotlib Cognition in depression
a physiological marker of negative emotional processing, during
the presentation of ambiguous stimuli. Moreover, using a modi-
fied word sentence association paradigm (Beard and Amir, 2009),
Hindash and Amir (2012) found that dysphoric individuals were
significantly faster to endorse associations between an ambiguous
sentence and a negative descriptor word than were non-dysphoric
individuals, again supporting an association between depressive
symptoms and negative interpretation biases.
Although potentially susceptible to response biases, evidence
for a negative interpretation bias in depression also comes from
studies using emotion recognition tasks; clinically depressed indi-
viduals have been found to be both slower (Leppänen et al., 2004)
and less accurate (Leppänen et al., 2004; Gollan et al., 2008)
than have non-disordered individuals in recognizing neutral emo-
tions. Moreover, clinically depressed participants have been found
to more often misinterpret neutral faces as sad, a bias that has
been found to persist following symptom remission (Leppänen
et al., 2004). Other investigators have observed that clinically
depressed individuals exhibit difficulties in the identification of
subtle positive emotion (but no difference in the identification of
low-intensity sadness; Suslow et al., 2001; Surguladze et al., 2004;
Joormann and Gotlib, 2006). Again, such difficulties have been
documented in remitted depressed individuals (Lemoult et al.,
2009), and have also been observed in individuals at high risk for
depression (Joormann et al., 2010), suggesting that biases in the
interpretation of facial emotion represent a risk factor for the onset
of a depressive episode.
In summary, studies examining interpretation biases in depres-
sion have yielded inconsistent results. This variability in findings
may be attributable to biases in self-report, or to the clinical
heterogeneity of the participant samples (e.g., sampling from dys-
phoric versus clinically depressed participants). Certainly, addi-
tional studies that examine individuals who are experiencing mod-
erate to severe depression, and that use indirect measures such as
reaction time to circumvent potential confounds caused by biases
in self-report, are needed to clarify the role of negative interpreta-
tion biases in MDD. Moreover, functional neuroimaging studies
would help to elucidate the neural correlates of these biases.
MEMORY BIASES
ENHANCED MEMORY FOR NEGATIVE MATERIAL
One of the most robust and consistent findings regarding cogni-
tive biases in depression involves the preferential recall of negative
over positive material (Watkins et al., 1992; Bradley et al., 1995b;
Ridout et al., 2003). In a meta-analysis of studies assessing recall
performance in clinical depression, Matt et al. (1992) found that
individuals with MDD remembered 10% more negative than pos-
itive words on explicit recall tasks. Other investigators have found
that clinically depressed individuals do not exhibit a bias toward
the encoding and recall of positive material that has been reported
in non-depressed persons (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2002; Ellwart
et al., 2003; Harmer et al., 2009b; Gotlib et al., 2011). It is important
to point out, however, that these findings have been obtained on
tasks of explicit memory; biases in memory for positive and neg-
ative stimuli in MDD are found less reliably in studies that assess
the unintentional encoding and/or retrieval of valenced material
(Matt et al., 1992). This pattern has led researchers to posit that
memory biases in depression are due in large part to increased elab-
oration occurring at later stages of attentional processing (Watkins,
2002). Consistent with this formulation, Koster et al. (2004) found,
in a sample of participants experiencing subclinical depression,
that attentional biases toward negative words predicted the num-
ber of negative words that were subsequently recalled in conditions
that allowed for elaborative processing, whereas no such bias was
found for words that were presented in conditions that prevented
elaborative processing.
Researchers conducting both lesion and functional neuroimag-
ing studies of healthy individuals have found that the amygdala
is centrally involved in the encoding and retrieval of emotional
material (Cahill et al., 1995; Adolphs et al., 1997). This structure
exerts a bottom-up influence on other brain regions, including
the hippocampus, which subserve episodic memory formation
and retrieval (Steinvorth et al., 2005). Given these findings, neu-
roimaging studies that have attempted to elucidate the neural
underpinnings of negative biases for negative material in explicit
memory tasks have focused largely on activations in this region.
In the first such study, Ramel et al. (2007) found bilateral amyg-
dala response during the encoding of emotional material predicted
increased recall of negative (but not of positive) words in formerly
depressed participants in whom a sad mood was induced. This
pattern was not observed in non-disordered participants or in
remitted depressed participants who did not receive a sad mood
induction. In the second study, Hamilton and Gotlib (2008) found
that increased memory sensitivity for negative material in clini-
cally depressed individuals was associated with greater activity in
the right amygdala during successful encoding of this material.
Again, this pattern of activation was not present in healthy par-
ticipants during the encoding of negative stimuli, or in depressed
participants during the encoding of positive stimuli. Interestingly,
Hamilton and Gotlib also found that increased activation of the
amygdala in depressed individuals was accompanied by increased
functional connectivity between the amygdala and the hippocam-
pus, caudate, and putamen, suggesting that during the encoding
of negative material, depressed individuals over-recruit a neural
network that is involved more generally in enhancing memory for
affective stimuli.
OVERGENERAL RECALL OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
In addition to biases in explicit memory, individuals experiencing
clinical depression have also been found to demonstrate over-
general recall of autobiographical memories (see Williams et al.,
2007a, for a review). Williams et al. (2007a) argue that reporting
overgeneral memories in response to negative cues on the autobio-
graphical memory test (AMT; Williams and Broadbent, 1986) may
represent attempts by individuals to protect against the negative
affective features that were encoded within the episodic memory
system. By recalling overly general descriptions of events that is,
one may minimize the experience of negative affect that is attached
to distressing memories by blocking access to the details of such
memories. Notably, previous studies have found that overgen-
eral memory in depression correlates with rumination, cognitive
deficits, and with longer durations of depressive episodes (Watkins
and Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Raes et al., 2005). Further, overgen-
eral positive memories have been found to predict both poorer
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recovery from depression (Brittlebank et al., 1993) and a longer
delay in recovery from affective disorders (Dalgleish et al., 2001).
Investigators are just beginning to understand the neural cor-
relates of overgeneral autobiographical memory in major depres-
sion. In one recent study, Zhu et al. (2012) observed significant
associations between patterns of connectivity within the default
mode network (DMN) and clinically depressed participants’ ten-
dency to recall overgeneral (versus specific) autobiographical
memories: depressed participants who recalled a greater num-
ber of overgeneral memories on the AMT exhibited significantly
decreased connectivity in the posterior regions of the DMN [pos-
terior cingulate cortex (PCC), precuneus, and angular gyrus].
Interestingly, posterior DMN regions, and in particular the PCC
and precuneus, have been found to play a role in the success-
ful retrieval of autobiographical and self-relevant information in
non-disordered individuals (Cavanna, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009;
Spreng and Grady, 2010). Thus, aberrant activity within, and con-
nectivity between, these regions may contribute to the patterns of
overgeneral recall that are observed in depression.
In a second study, Whalley et al. (2012) compared activation
patterns between clinically depressed and non-disordered individ-
uals as they viewed cue words referencing a past autobiographical
event. Whalley et al. found that although both groups exhibited
similar patterns of activation in regions associated with autobi-
ographical memory retrieval (e.g., PCC), depressed individuals
showed reduced activity in the vlPFC, an area that has been posited
to be a central component to autobiographical networks (Gilboa,
2004; Svoboda et al., 2006). Thus, reduced function in this region
could be associated, in addition posterior portions of the DMN,
with poorer retrieval of personal memories.
DEFICITS IN THE COGNITIVE CONTROL OF PROCESSING
NEGATIVE MATERIAL
Overriding prepotent responses and inhibiting the processing of
irrelevant material that captures attention are core abilities that
allow individuals to respond flexibly and to adjust their behav-
ior and emotional responses to changing situations. Deficits in
cognitive control and inhibition may be associated with the elabo-
rative and memory biases that we described above that characterize
depressed individuals. In this section, we focus on studies that have
examined valence-specific abnormalities in cognition involving
inhibition and working memory in MDD.
INHIBITION
The negative priming task is one of several experimental tasks that
have been used effectively to assess difficulties in cognitive control
and inhibition. In this task, participants are asked to respond to a
target in the presence of a distractor. For example, on one trial, par-
ticipants may be asked to name a word written in red ink (target)
while ignoring a simultaneously presented word written in blue
ink (distractor). Negative priming occurs when inhibition to the
blue word remains activated, delaying the response to a target on a
subsequent trial if that target is identical to or related to the previ-
ously ignored distractor. Thus, delays in responding can be used to
assess inhibitory function. In the context of depression, an emo-
tional version of this task, the negative affective priming (NAP)
task, has been used to assess depressed individuals’ability to inhibit
the processing of irrelevant negative material. In the NAP task, a
negatively valenced distractor on one trial becomes the target on
the subsequent trial, allowing investigators to test the hypothesis
that if depressed individuals are unable to inhibit the processing of
the distractor, they will be faster than non-disordered controls to
name the subsequent target. Findings from these studies show that
both clinically (Goeleven et al., 2006; Joormann and Gotlib, 2010)
and subclinically (Joormann, 2004) depressed individuals respond
more quickly than do their non-disordered peers when a negative
target is presented following the presentation of a negative distrac-
tor. No group differences have been found, however, in reaction
times for positive material, suggesting that depressed individuals
exhibit difficulties in inhibiting the processing of irrelevant nega-
tive, but not of irrelevant positive, material. In addition, difficulties
inhibiting negative distractors have been found to be significantly
associated with the severity of rumination, even after controlling
for level of depressive symptoms (Joormann, 2006; Joormann and
Gotlib, 2010).
One functional neuroimaging study of clinically depressed par-
ticipants has used the NAP task to examine the neural basis
of these inhibitory difficulties (Eugène et al., 2010). Results of
this investigation showed that problems inhibiting the processing
of irrelevant negative material were associated with heightened
activity in the rACC of depressed participants. Non-disordered
individuals, in contrast, demonstrated heightened activity in this
region during the inhibition of positive information. While these
findings implicate aberrant functioning of the rACC in difficulties
of depressed persons inhibiting the processing of irrelevant neg-
ative material, it is important to note that, as was the case in the
emotional Stroop task, increased activation in the rACC to irrele-
vant negative material in depression could reflect either increased
salience of this material for the depressed participants (leading to
increased conflict when they are required to ignore negative mater-
ial), and/or difficulties experienced by these participants when they
attempt to override automatic responding to these salient stimuli.
Indeed, as we discussed above, the latter possibility is consistent
with previous work that has implicated the engagement of rACC in
the monitoring of emotional conflict (Etkin et al., 2006). Future
studies that attempt to tease apart the effects of attention from
inhibition with respect to performance on these tasks are needed.
WORKING MEMORY
Efficient functioning of working memory systems depends on
inhibition, not only to limit the access of information into work-
ing memory, but also to remove this information from working
memory stores once it is no longer relevant (Hasher and Zacks,
1998). Understanding the biases of working memory systems in
depression is important because dysfunctions in expelling nega-
tive material from working memory as it becomes irrelevant could
lead to difficulties attending to and processing new information
and, as a result, to rumination, thereby increasing the likelihood
of the onset or maintenance of a depressive episode.
One task that has been used reliably to investigate the role of
working memory processes in depression is the emotional Stern-
berg working memory task (Joormann and Gotlib,2008). This par-
adigm requires participants to first memorize two simultaneously
presented lists of words. A cue then appears that instructs
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participants to forget one word list and maintain the other. Finally,
a word recognition, or “probe,” epoch is presented when partici-
pants must indicate whether the probe word came from the list
they were previously cued to remember, from the list they were
cued to forget (i.e., the no longer relevant list), or did not come
from either list. The difference in reaction times to an intrusion
probe (i.e., a probe from the irrelevant list) and reaction times to a
new probe (i.e., a completely new word) reflects the strength of the
residual activation of the contents of working memory that were
declared to be no longer relevant and, therefore, assesses a person’s
ability to remove irrelevant information from working memory
(Oberauer, 2001). By manipulating the valence of the relevant
and irrelevant word lists, as is the case in the emotional Sternberg
working memory task, investigators can assess participants’ ability
to remove negative and positive material from working memory.
Using this task, Joormann and Gotlib (2008) found that clin-
ically depressed individuals exhibit longer decision latencies than
do their non-disordered counterparts to negative (but not to posi-
tive or neutral) probe words from the no longer relevant word lists.
This finding was subsequently replicated (Berman et al., 2011), and
is consistent with the formulation that depression is associated
with difficulties in disengaging from negative information that
was once, but is no longer relevant. This valence-specific deficit
in working memory may help to explain why depressed individu-
als respond to negative life events with recurring, uncontrollable,
and unintentional negative thoughts. Consistent with this pos-
sibility, Joormann and Gotlib (2008) found that deficits in the
removal of no longer relevant negative information from working
memory were associated with the severity of rumination, a find-
ing that remained significant even when controlling for depressive
symptoms.
Our group recently adapted the emotional Sternberg task for
use in a functional neuroimaging investigation to examine whether
difficulties removing negative information from working memory
in depression were associated with anomalous neural function
(Foland-Ross et al., in press). Results from our investigation indi-
cated that during the presentation of the instruction cue, when
participants are required to forget one word list and maintain
the other, clinically depressed individuals showed greater activa-
tion than did non-disordered control participants in the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), superior parietal lobule (SPL),
and insular cortices when expelling negative information. In con-
trast, control participants exhibited stronger activation in these
regions when attempting to expel positive material. Interestingly,
the dACC, SPL, and insular regions are important components
of the task positive network (TPN), a collection of structures
that has been postulated to subserve active cognitive processing
(e.g., executive control and working memory; Fox et al., 2005).
Moreover, activation in these structures has been documented to
increase linearly with cognitive effort (Paus et al., 1998; Wager
et al., 2005; Allen et al., 2007). Depressed individuals, therefore,
may exert greater cognitive and neural effort than do their non-
depressed counterparts in removing no longer relevant negative
material from working memory.
While these studies demonstrate that depressed individuals
are less able than are non-depressed persons to expel negative
information from working memory, thereby exacerbating the
effects of negative content on cognition, other investigators have
examined whether depressed individuals are also impaired at
selecting relevant positive material for processing in working
memory. Difficulties in this area could limit depressed persons’
ability to use positive material to ameliorate the adverse effects of
processing negative information. Levens and Gotlib (2009) exam-
ined this possibility using an emotional version of the recency-
probes task. In this task, participants are presented with a set
of three target words, followed by a brief fixation, and then a
probe display, in which a single word is presented. Participants are
asked to indicate, using a button press, whether the probe word
was previously presented as one of three words in the target set.
Individuals’ ability to successfully select material for processing
in working memory is assessed using reaction times to probes
during interference trials, in which the probe word is not a mem-
ber of the target set for that trial, but was a member of previous
target sets. Longer response times during these trials reflect impair-
ments in the selection of that material for initial processing in
working memory. Levens and Gotlib found that, compared to
non-disordered controls, clinically depressed individuals exhib-
ited longer response times during interference trials for positive
(but not for negative or neutral) stimuli, indicating that depressed
persons are impaired in selecting task-relevant positive stimuli for
processing in working memory.
In sum, the results of research examining cognitive inhibitory
functioning in depression suggest that depressed individuals expe-
rience problems both inhibiting the access of irrelevant negative
material into working memory and disengaging from this mater-
ial in working memory once it is no longer relevant. In addition,
depressed individuals do not show the normative bias toward the
selection and maintenance of positive material demonstrated by
non-depressed individuals. Difficulties in the control of working
memory contents, in turn, appear related to dysfunctioning of
the rACC as well as components of the TPN. Below, we review
research that has attempted to link cognitive difficulties and biases
to the dysregulation of emotion that has been found to characterize
individuals diagnosed with MDD.
EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE BIASES ON EMOTION REGULATION
IN DEPRESSION
Cognitive deficits and biases in the processing of emotional infor-
mation are likely to impair depressed individuals’ ability to adap-
tively regulate their emotions. Below, we discuss how biases in
attention and memory, and difficulties in cognitive control, might
affect emotion regulation processes in depression, and contribute
to persistent negative mood.
ATTENTION
Arguably one of the easiest ways to regulate emotion is to try to
look away from or ignore an emotion-eliciting stimulus or situ-
ation. Individual differences in attention for emotional informa-
tion, therefore, represent one important factor that may influence
emotional states. As we have described earlier in this paper, depres-
sion does not appear to be characterized by a rapid automatic
biasing toward negative information. Rather, once this mate-
rial captures initial attention, individuals experiencing clinical
depression have difficulty disengaging from this material. This
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tendency of being“stuck”in attending to negative aspects of the sit-
uation may prevent depressed people from using effective emotion
regulation strategies such as distraction and attentional avoidance
when confronted with stressful events. Moreover, biases in atten-
tion may interfere with a person’s ability to successfully reframe
emotion-eliciting events and lead to the sustained processing of
emotion-eliciting stimuli and prolonged negative affect.
Several studies of non-disordered samples have investigated
whether difficulties disengaging from negative information can
increase emotion reactivity and impair emotion regulation efforts.
Compton et al. (2000) reported that decreased ability to disengage
attention from negative stimuli was related to increased reactiv-
ity to an upsetting film. Similarly, Ellenbogen et al. (2006) found
that problems disengaging attention from dysphoric images was
associated with increased negative affective in response to a sub-
sequent stressor. MacLeod and Hagan (1992) extended these find-
ings by demonstrating that women with the strongest attentional
biases toward negative material reported the greatest increases
in distress following a diagnosis of cancer. Given this research,
it will be important in future studies for investigators to exam-
ine, using causal experimental designs, whether attentional biases
have deleterious effects on emotional reactivity in individuals with
depression.
It will also be important to examine the neural relations
between attention and emotional experience. Van Reekum et al.
(2007) found that, when cognitively reappraising negative scenes,
non-disordered participants tended to shift their gaze away from
the extremities of an image, and that individual differences in
gaze fixation accounted for a significant portion of variance in
neural activation of the amygdala. These findings suggest not only
that effortful forms of emotion regulation rely, at least in part,
on attention, but further, that the ability to disengage attention
from emotion-inducing aspects of a situation can directly influ-
ence activity in brain regions that work to mediate emotional
responses. Whether there are similar relations among emotion,
gaze, and neural function in depression is unknown.
INTERPRETATION OF EMOTIONALLY AMBIGUOUS INFORMATION
Individuals often impose meaning on ambiguous situations with-
out intervening awareness of possible alternative interpretations.
An increase in the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations
as negative could influence vulnerability to experience negative
mood. Evidence in support of this postulation comes from studies
of non-clinical samples that have examined the relation between
interpretation biases and prospective measures of mood symp-
toms and emotional reactivity. Rude et al. (2002) found that
greater negative interpretation bias in non-disordered partici-
pants was significantly associated with an increase in depressive
symptoms at a follow-up assessment. In a subsequent study,
Holmes et al. (2009) observed that training positive biases in non-
disordered individuals helped to alleviate the effects of an induced
negative mood state. Training a negative interpretation bias, in
turn, was found by Wilson et al. (2006) to predict heightened
emotional reactivity to a subsequent stressful video clip. Thus, the
tendency to interpret ambiguous scenarios in a negative or posi-
tive manner likely influences the generation and experience of an
emotional response.
MEMORY
Biases in memory can also influence emotion regulation in sig-
nificant ways. It is well documented, for example, that recalling
positive autobiographical memories can repair negative mood in
non-disordered individuals (Josephson et al., 1996; Rusting and
Dehart, 2000; Joormann and Siemer, 2004). Increased memory
sensitivity for negative material in depression, therefore, could
contribute to the difficulties for depressed individuals to access
mood-incongruent (i.e., positive) material, causing interference
with the selection and use of positive memories to regulate emo-
tion. Consistent with this formulation, Josephson et al. (1996)
found that, whereas non-clinical samples of undergraduate stu-
dents who scored low on measures of depression severity tended
to retrieve positive memories following sad mood induction, indi-
viduals reporting more severe negative mood symptoms were
more likely to retrieve mood-congruent memories. Students in this
study, in turn, who engaged in mood-incongruent recall following
a negative mood induction showed the greatest improvement in
subsequent mood.
Other studies suggest that clinically depressed individuals are
as able as their non-disordered peers to recall positive memories,
but are less effective in using these memories to repair negative
mood states. For example, Joormann et al. (2007a) had clinically
depressed, remitted depressed, and never-depressed participants
report levels of affect following the induction of a sad mood, and
again after they wrote a list of positive autobiographical events.
Joormann et al. found that, although the groups did not differ
in the number, intensity, or specificity of positive autobiographi-
cal events that they recalled, whereas never-depressed participants’
mood improved following the recall of positive memories, the sad
mood of remitted and currently depressed participants remained
unchanged or had worsened.
Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory may also
influence emotion regulation in depression. As we note above,
overgeneral memory represents one avoidance strategy that may
be useful in minimizing distress in the short term (Raes et al.,
2003). In the longer term, however, overgeneral memory places
individuals at increased risk for developing depression (Gibbs and
Rude, 2004). Although the precise reasons for this process are
unclear, theorists have speculated that avoiding the recall of spe-
cific aspects of past events hinders the development of effective
strategies for solving interpersonal problems (Evans et al., 1992).
Poor problem-solving abilities, in turn, could lead to more neg-
ative social encounters in the future (Hermans et al., 2005), and
contribute to increased negative mood.
COGNITIVE CONTROL
Biases in cognitive control may also contribute to emotion-
regulatory difficulties in depression. One common type of emo-
tion regulation strategy that is both highly dependent on cognitive
control mechanisms and that is effective in altering the trajec-
tory of an unfolding emotional response is cognitive reappraisal.
This approach to emotion regulation involves cognitively refram-
ing the meaning of a stimulus or event in a manner that makes
the event less distressing. Individuals who more frequently use
cognitive reappraisal have fewer depressive symptoms than do
individuals who use other emotion regulation strategies, such
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as emotion suppression and rumination (Gross and John, 2003;
Campbell-Sills et al., 2006; Garnefski and Kraaij, 2006, 2007).
Neuroimaging studies demonstrate that engagement in cognitive
reappraisal strategies is associated with increases in activation of
the dACC and ventro- and dorsolateral PFC, and with decreases
in activation of areas that mediate emotional responding, such
as the amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004). This inverse cou-
pling between frontal and subcortical limbic areas is consistent
with the formulation that reappraisal triggers top-down cogni-
tive control of emotion-generating systems. Moreover, the finding
that reappraisal activates the same regions that are activated in
working memory and inhibition – areas that are dysfunctional in
depression (Elliott et al., 2002; Beauregard et al., 2006; Johnstone
et al., 2007; Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008; Erk et al., 2010; Eugène
et al., 2010; Kerestes et al., 2012) – supports the position that emo-
tion regulation depends on cognitive functioning in these areas,
and that dysfunction in these regions, paired with difficulties in
controlling negative, mood-congruent contents of working mem-
ory, may directly impair depressed individuals’ ability to flexibly
reappraise or reinterpret life events or situations (Siemer, 2005,
2007).
Investigators have just begun to examine neural correlates
of effortful emotion regulation in depression. Beauregard et al.
(2006) found that clinically depressed individuals experienced
more difficulty in regulating emotional responses to a sad film
clip than did never-depressed participants, and that this difficulty
was related to increased activity in the dACC. Similarly, John-
stone et al. (2007) found that, during the cognitive reappraisal of
negative images, non-disordered individuals exhibited an inverse
correlation between activation in the amygdala and vmPFC. In
contrast, clinically depressed participants demonstrated a positive
correlation between these regions, as well as heightened activation
in a separate, more dorsal, portion of the PFC, suggesting that
effortful attempts to reappraise negative situations in depression
are counterproductive. And finally, in a cognitive reappraisal study
reported by Erk et al. (2010), clinically depressed individuals were
found to be able to down-regulate amygdala responses; however,
this effect was short-lived and was associated with decreased acti-
vation of the dlPFC. Taken together, although replication studies
are certainly needed, a picture of neural dysfunction is beginning
to emerge in depression indicating that emotion regulation in this
disorder is associated with abnormalities in prefrontal function.
Importantly, negative biases in inhibitory and working mem-
ory function may contribute to the occurrence of rumination.
Ruminative responding – or the recurrent, self-reflective, and
unintentional focus on depressive symptoms and their possible
causes and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) – has been sig-
nificantly associated with difficulties in the ability of depressed
persons to inhibit, expel or disengage from negative cognitions,
and memories that were once, but are no longer, relevant (Joor-
mann, 2006; Joormann and Gotlib, 2008, 2010). Rumination, in
turn, may exacerbate negative emotional states; in a study of indi-
viduals experiencing subclinical depression, Williams and Moulds
(2010) found that participants who were induced to ruminate
reported more negative mood and rated intrusive memories as
more distressing than did dysphoric participants who were dis-
tracted. Moreover, in a recent review, Nolen-Hoeksema et al.
(2008) reported evidence suggesting that a greater tendency to
ruminate, when combined with negative cognitive biases, predicts
longer episodes of depression. Clearly, therefore, a vicious cycle can
emerge between deficits in cognitive control and negative mood
states, and represents an important area for further research.
TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS
The cognitive biases and deficits that have been found to character-
ize depression may represent important targets for intervention.
Indeed, given findings demonstrating that biases in attention,
memory, and cognitive control are associated with course of illness
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2007), ameliorating dysfunction at the cogni-
tive level may help to reduce depressive symptomatology, as well
as other features of depression, such as rumination. As we review
in this section, a small, but growing body of research has found
that cognitive biases can be targeted directly by computer-based
training paradigms, and that this training is effective in reducing
depressive symptoms.
ATTENTION
Investigators attempting to manipulate attentional biases in
depression have used a modified dot-probe task. In the training
version of this paradigm, a pair of stimuli are presented to the par-
ticipant, but the subsequent probe is presented more frequently
in the location of the neutral or positive stimulus than in the
location of the negative stimulus, thereby directing participants’
attention away from the negative stimulus and toward the neutral
or positive stimulus. This attentional training procedure has been
found to reduce subsequent emotional reactivity to induced or
to real-life stressors in undiagnosed participants (MacLeod et al.,
2002; Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2004; Dandeneau et al., 2007). In
two recent experiments of individuals experiencing clinical and
subclinical depression, Baert et al. (2010) examined the effects
of attentional bias modification on depressive symptomatology.
Importantly, given that depression appears to be characterized
by biases that occur in later stages of stimulus processing (see
Teachman et al., 2012 for a review), Baert et al. had participants
perform a dot-probe training task in which stimuli were presented
at supraliminal durations (e.g., 1500 ms). Results of these investi-
gations showed that 2 weeks of training away from negative and
toward positive stimuli led to improvements in depressive sympto-
matology in mildly depressed participants; however, participants
with more severe symptoms of depression did not show such
improvement. The reasons for this latter finding are not clear,
and it is important for investigators to examine more explicitly the
mechanisms underlying the apparent differential effectiveness of
attentional bias training.
In another study of mild to moderately depressed participants,
Wells and Beevers (2010) examined the effects of four sessions of
attention training away from negative and toward neutral stimuli,
again using relatively longer stimulus durations to allow partic-
ipants to more fully process the content of the stimuli. These
investigators found that four sessions of training over a period of
2 weeks resulted in a significant and immediate decrease in depres-
sive symptoms that was not present in participants who received
sham training. Moreover, these reductions were found to persist in
a 2-week follow-up assessment. Interestingly,path analyses showed
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that symptom improvement was mediated by attention modifica-
tion training, suggesting that the manipulation of this bias directly
affected symptom levels.
INTERPRETATION OF EMOTIONALLY AMBIGUOUS INFORMATION
Few studies have examined whether modifying negative interpre-
tation biases can have a significant impact on negative affect in
depressed individuals, despite demonstrations that computerized
cognitive bias modification (CBM) techniques that target inter-
pretation (CBM-I) can cause a significant increase in the tendency
for non-disordered participants to interpret new and emotion-
ally ambiguous information in a positive manner (Holmes et al.,
2006, 2009). In this training approach, individuals are repeatedly
presented with potentially ambiguous scenarios whose interpreta-
tion is constrained in a particular direction (positive or negative).
In non-disordered samples, repeated positive CBM-I training ses-
sions have been found to reduce vulnerability to anxiety to a later
stressor (MacKintosh et al., 2006). Further, positive CBM-I has
been found to be effective in reducing negative interpretative biases
in individuals who report high levels of anxiety (Mathews et al.,
2007; Murphy et al., 2007; Salemink et al., 2009).
Only one study to date has examined the effects of positive
CBM-I training in depression. Blackwell and Holmes (2010) had
depressed individuals listen to a series of ambiguous situations
in which ambiguity was resolved in a positive direction. Follow-
ing daily sessions of positive CBM-I training for 1 week, four out
of seven of the depressed participants demonstrated significant
improvements in depressive symptoms. Moreover, these effects
were maintained at follow-up, 2 weeks later. Although modest,
such a response rate is comparable to that of studies examin-
ing efficacy of antidepressant medication or CBT (Hollon et al.,
2002). Thus, more rigorous testing using larger samples with a
sham control group is warranted.
MEMORY
Given studies showing that overgeneral memory influences the
course of depression (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Dalgleish et al., 2001;
Watkins and Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Raes et al., 2005), investigators
have also begun to examine the effects of interventions designed to
increase memory sensitivity. Watkins et al. (2009) found that train-
ing participants with subclinical depression to actively engage in
generating concrete construals (e.g., focusing on specific details of
an event) when thinking about autobiographical memories led to
significant reductions in both depressive symptoms and frequency
of rumination. In another study of more severely depressed partic-
ipants, Raes et al. (2009) found that training clinically depressed
inpatients to recall more specific memories generated improve-
ments in their memory retrieval, level of rumination, and quality
of problem-solving. Thus, overgeneral memory may represent
another cognitive aspect of depression that, like attention, is
amenable to successful modification.
Researchers have also examined whether biases in explicit mem-
ory are amenable to training. In a study investigating whether
individuals could be trained to forget negative material using
a modified “Think-No-Think” (TNT) paradigm (Anderson and
Green, 2001), Joormann et al. (2009) presented clinically depressed
and non-disordered participants with word pairs consisting of one
neutral cue word and one positive or negative target word. In an
initial learning phase, participants were asked to learn cue-target
associations. Participants were then instructed not to think about
the negative targets when shown their neutral cues, but instead,
to either think of a new valenced word (substitute condition) or
to refrain from thinking of another word (unaided condition).
Joormann et al. found that, when asked to recall the original tar-
get words, depressed participants in the substitute, but not in
the unaided condition showed successful forgetting of negative
words. Moreover, the number of negative targets they forgot was
directly related to length of training. Thus, although this study
examined memory performance within a single session and did
not assess symptom change, these findings are promising in sug-
gesting that future training paradigms could be developed, using
modified versions of the TNT task, to help depressed individuals
suppress their enhanced retrieval of negative material.
COGNITIVE CONTROL
Although difficulties in controlling the access and manipulation of
negative material into working memory represent clear features of
cognitive disturbance in depression, few studies have examined
whether modifying this domain of cognition can have benefi-
cial effects on depressive symptomatology. Indeed, in the only
study that has examined the effects of cognitive control training
on depression, Siegle et al. (2007a) had clinically depressed and
non-disordered participants undergo 2 weeks of training using
a pair of tasks: a variant of the Paced Auditory Serial Attention
Task (Gronwall, 1977), in which individuals continuously add
serially presented digits in working memory, and an attention
task (Wells, 2000) that requires participants to selectively attend
to specific environmental auditory stimuli. Results of this study
showed that mood symptoms decreased continuously in clinically
depressed individuals throughout the two-weeks of intervention,
as did rumination. Moreover, analyses of neural data from a sub-
sample of the depressed participants in this study revealed that
cognitive control training was associated with a reduction in amyg-
dala reactivity to negative affective stimuli, as well as an increase
in dlPFC activity during the performance of a working memory
task. Given these initial findings, as well data from several studies
of dementia indicating that cognitive control training has a signifi-
cant, although unexpected,effect of lowering depressive symptoms
(see Sitzer et al., 2006 for a review), the potential impact of cogni-
tive control training on depressive symptoms and diagnosis, and
on levels of ruminative thinking, is promising.
TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS: SUMMARY
The available research suggests that depression-associated biases
in attention, memory, interpretation, and cognitive control may
be targeted directly using computer-based training paradigms,
and that attenuating these biases may effectively reduce severity
of depressive symptoms. Such training approaches could serve as
useful monotherapies, or alternatively, may be used as adjunc-
tive tools for other pharmacologic and therapeutic interventions.
Given evidence that information processing biases may be present
prior to the initial onset of depression (Joormann et al., 2007b,
2010), future investigations should examine whether early inter-
ventions with cognitive training could prevent the onset of MDD

























































Foland-Ross and Gotlib Cognition in depression
through inhibiting or reversing the development of dysfunctional
schemas. At the same time, because some bias modification pro-
cedures have been found to be effective only in individuals who
are experiencing mild symptoms of depression (e.g., Baert et al.,
2010), investigations examining the parameters of effective train-
ing programs for specific types or severity of depression would be
helpful to prevention efforts.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As we have documented in this review, the available research finds
that a diagnosis of MDD is accompanied by increased elaboration
of negative information, a tendency to interpret ambiguous infor-
mation as negative, difficulties disengaging from negative material,
and deficits in cognitive control when processing this material.
Neuroimaging investigations of the neural bases of these diffi-
culties find, in the context of biases in attention, that sustained
processing of negative affective material in depression is associated
both with prolonged activation of the amygdala and dysfunction in
the rACC. Examinations of the neural underpinnings of enhanced
memory for negative material in depression, in turn, appear to be
associated with the over-recruitment of the amygdala, as well as
other subcortical regions that are involved more generally in the
encoding of affective material. And finally, problems in controlling
and inhibiting the processing of negative material in depression
relates to dysfunction in higher-order cognitive control regions,
including the ACC, dlPFC, and vlPFC.
Several important goals for future research remain. One
involves the more systematic mapping of links between cogni-
tive and affective aspects of depression. It will be critical, for
example, for researchers to elucidate the causal nature of the rela-
tion between depressed mood and cognition. This issue could be
addressed through studies that continue to investigate the impact
of cognitive retraining on emotion, or through longitudinal inves-
tigations that examine whether cognitive biases observed during a
clinically significant episode of depression resolve following suc-
cessful treatment with medication. Along these lines, it would be
helpful for future studies to understand the mechanisms by which
cognitive retraining improves mood; it is currently unclear, for
example, whether retraining attention biases in depression alters
symptom profiles through altering bottom-up processes involved
in generation of affect, top-down processes involved in the regu-
lation of affect, or through influencing other aspects of cognitive
functioning (e.g., memory).
In addressing possible interactions between cognitive biases,
investigators have begun discussions on the “near” and “far”
transfer of training effects of CBM (Hertel and Mathews, 2011;
MacLeod and Mathews, 2012). While bias modification training
typically transfers to new stimulus materials presented in assess-
ment versions of a task (near transfer), changes in emotional
functioning or performance on tasks that are less closely related to
the training task (far transfer) are particularly informative for our
understanding of mechanisms. Findings from a small of collec-
tion of recent investigations indicate that far transfer effects occur
with training that is focused on discrete aspects of cognition. One
instance of this comes from a study by White et al. (2011), who
found that attention bias training leads to changes in interpre-
tive biases. Similarly, training of interpretation biases have been
found to influence biases in both attention (Amir et al., 2010) and
memory (Salemink et al., 2010; Tran et al., 2011). These findings
suggest not only that the distinctions made by researchers among
biases in attention, interpretation, and memory need to be recon-
sidered, but further, that at least some aspects of these biases share
common mechanisms of action.
Future studies will also benefit from the integration of cogni-
tive biases with other biological aspects of depression. A number
of recent studies have found that reductions in serotonin levels,
induced by tryptophan depletion, causes cognitive impairments
in non-disordered individuals that are similar to those found
in depression. This includes reduced autobiographical memory
specificity (Alhaj et al., 2012), selective encoding of negative mater-
ial (Wang et al., 2009), and attention toward negative stimuli (Mur-
phy et al., 2002; Roiser et al., 2008). Moreover, similar to clinically
depressed individuals, increased amygdala responses to negative
material (Roiser et al., 2008), and altered activation in ventrolateral
prefrontal regions during the processing of task-irrelevant nega-
tive distractors (Wang et al., 2009) are also found in participants
treated using acute tryptophan depleting compounds. Further
support for the involvement of serotonin in neural and cogni-
tive abnormalities in depression comes from studies examining
associations between these measures and polymorphisms of the
serotonin transporter-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR):
compared to long-allele homozygotes, individuals who carry one
or two 5-HTTLPR short alleles have been found to exhibit dif-
ficulties disengaging attention from emotional stimuli (Beevers
et al., 2009) and to have greater amygdala reactivity to sad material
(Hariri et al., 2005). Given these findings, it follows that cognitive
biases in depression may be modulated, at least in part, by sero-
tonergic systems, and that negative affective biases are amenable
to treatment with medications that target this system (e.g., SSRIs;
Clark et al., 2009; Harmer et al., 2009a). To date, however, investi-
gators have not examined changes in cognitive biases in depressed
individuals as a consequence of pharmacological treatment. Cer-
tainly, an investigation into the interaction between serotonin and
cognition represents an area for promising research in depres-
sion. Along these lines, studies examining the relation between
cognition and other aspects of neurobiological function impli-
cated in depression and in the regulation of affective states (e.g.,
dopamine, cortisol) would be helpful in the developing a more
complete understanding of the cognitive abnormalities that are
associated with MDD.
Finally, a small, but growing body of literature is demonstrat-
ing that depression-related biases in cognition are not necessarily
correlates or consequences of the experience of depression, but
could reflect a pattern of dysfunction that precedes the initial
onset of this disorder. Indeed, like depressed adults, young indi-
viduals who are not themselves depressed but are at high risk
for developing depression by virtue of having a depressed parent
have been found to demonstrate negative biases in the interpre-
tation (Dearing and Gotlib, 2009) and identification (Joormann
et al., 2010) of neutral and emotional material. Moreover, sim-
ilar to depressed adults, never-disordered girls at familial risk
for depression selectively attend to negative facial expressions
on the dot-probe task (Joormann et al., 2007b). It is possible,
therefore, that negative biases in cognition play a direct role in
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placing children of depressed parents at increased risk for devel-
oping a depressive disorder. A necessary next step to address-
ing this question involves using longitudinal designs to examine
whether specific cognitive biases can predict which high risk indi-
viduals are at greatest risk for developing depression. Similarly,
given neuroimaging findings that familial risk for depression is
associated with depression-related abnormalities in brain struc-
ture (Peterson et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Rao et al., 2010;
Huang et al., 2011) and function (Monk et al., 2008; Mannie
et al., 2011), it would be helpful if future studies could examine
whether abnormalities in neural measures are useful in predicting
the onset of depression. Furthermore, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, given the initial promise of cognitive retraining procedures
in altering cognitive biases in adults with depression, researchers
need to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how
cognitive retraining might be used in the prevention of major
depression.
In reviewing the literature on cognitive biases in depression, we
have described several sources of methodological variability that,
if addressed, may increase the consistency in the results of future
studies. First, despite recent estimates that up to 65% of depressed
individuals experience clinically significant symptoms of anxiety
(Brown et al., 2001), the effects of this comorbidity on the neural
and behavioral measures of depression are not fully understood.
Although current evidence suggests that trait levels of anxiety may
account for biases in subliminal attention that have been reported
in some studies of clinical depression (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010;
Teachman et al., 2012), additional research is needed examining
the effects of this comorbidity on automatic perception and other
aspects of cognition and neural function. Second, cognitive biases
in depression may be influenced by the duration of MDD; indi-
viduals who are experiencing a first episode of depression have
been found to exhibit a different pattern of emotional responding
than do individuals who have experienced recurrent episodes of
depression (e.g., Nandrino et al., 2004). Related to this issue are
findings showing that cognitive and neural processing biases in
depression (Suslow et al., 2010) are affected by depression severity
(e.g., Dannlowski et al., 2007a; Suslow et al., 2010). Third, there
is evidence to suggest that task performance varies as a function
of how depressed individuals process experimental stimuli. Some
investigators, for example, have found depressed individuals to
exhibit difficulties inhibiting the processing of mood-congruent
material, but only when this material was processed in a self-
referential manner (Segal et al., 1995; Power et al., 2000). Along
these lines, there is also evidence showing that stimulus type (e.g.,
words versus images) influences task performance (Isaac et al.,
2012). Fourth, future investigations of depression are likely to
benefit from researchers controlling for trauma history. Child-
hood maltreatment is a significant predictor of both amygdala
response (Dannlowski et al., in press), and biases in attention
(Fani et al., 2010) in adult participants. Moreover, epidemio-
logical studies show that trauma occurring during childhood is
associated with the onset and severity of depressive symptoms
during adulthood (see Heim et al., 2008 for a review). Fifth, the
effects of gender on depression-related abnormalities in neural
and cognitive is still unclear; investigators often combine men
and women in their samples or sample exclusively from women.
Given that men and women have different clinical manifestations
of depression (Piccinelli and Wilkinson, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema,
2001), studies examining how emotional material is processed in
depressed females versus males would be helpful in elucidating
the parameters of cognitive and neural biases in major depression.
Such research could also help to explain the gender difference in
the prevalence of MDD (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema and Hilt, 2009).
Finally, investigators should examine more closely and control for
the effects of psychotropic medication on cognition and neural
function. Given the findings we presented earlier showing that tar-
geted manipulation of the serotonergic system using tryptophan
depletion leads to cognitive and neural changes in non-disordered
adults that resemble those found in major depression, the issue of
exactly how SSRIs or medications targeting other neurotransmit-
ter systems may affect neurocognitive profiles of depressed adults
clearly warrants further research.
In closing, although there are several issues that require further
study, the available research indicates that MDD is characterized
by significant impairments in the processing of mood-congruent
material in the context of attention, interpretation, memory, and
cognitive control, and that these cognitive difficulties contribute to
difficulties in emotion regulation and neural dysfunction. Investi-
gators have also provided important new leads in the development
of alternative treatments for depression in the form of computer-
based cognitive bias retraining paradigms, which may be helpful as
adjuncts to existing therapies or as prevention strategies in individ-
uals at high risk for developing this disorder. It will be important
to continue to integrate findings across different research modal-
ities in order to inform etiological models of depression and
advance the development of new approaches to the prevention
and treatment of this debilitating disorder.
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